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1 
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES V INTRODUCTION 
 
Margaret A. Berger∗ 
 
Once again, the Journal of Law and Policy is publishing 
extended versions of papers relating to science and law that were 
presented at a conference for federal and state judges.1 The 
conference, which took place at Brooklyn Law School on April 1 
and 2, 2005, was the fifth in a series of Science for Judges 
programs funded by the Common Benefit Trust established in the 
Silicone Breast Implant Products Liability Litigation. It was held 
under the auspices of Brooklyn Law School’s Center for Health, 
Science and Public Policy in collaboration with the Federal 
Judicial Center, the National Center for State Courts, and the 
Committee on Science, Technology and Law of the National 
Academies of Science. 
Science for Judges V dealt with two very different sets of 
questions that arise in connection with science in the courtroom. 
The first day’s session focused on Risk Assessment, a topic that 
confronts judges when ruling on expert proof of causation in toxic 
tort cases. The second day’s session considered issues relevant to 
the Availability of Data, a subject of importance to the effective 
functioning of both science and the law—research depends on data 
                                                          
 ∗ Suzanne J. and Norman Miles Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. 
Professor Berger is the Director of the Science for Judges Program. 
 1 Papers from previous Science for Judges programs can be found in 12 J.L. 
& POL’Y 1, 1-53 (2003) (papers discussing the practice of epidemiology and the 
science produced by administrative agencies); 12 J.L. & POL’Y 485, 485-639 
(2004) (papers discussing toxicology and epidemiology); 13 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1-
179 (2005) (papers discussing the integrity of scientific research and forensic 
evidence in criminal proceedings); and 13 J.L. & POL’Y 499-647 (2005) (papers 
discussing Agent Orange and human behavior research). All papers are available 
in electronic form at http://brooklaw.edu/centers/scienceforjudges/papers.php. 
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and so does litigation. 
In the first essay dealing with causation, Professor Gary 
Marchant predicts that within the next decade toxic tort litigation 
will be transformed by the availability of genetic information.2 His 
discussion focuses on two different types of data that have the 
potential to radically transform the process of proving causation: 1) 
data on the genetic susceptibility of individual plaintiffs and 2) 
genetic biomarkers of exposure and effect. Professor Marchant 
examines the extent to which these types of evidence have been 
introduced in judicial proceedings to date, and analyzes the 
complex scientific and legal issues that must be resolved before the 
legal system can utilize this information to make the outcomes of 
toxic tort litigation more accurate and fair. Professor Marchant’s 
essay provides judges and lawyers with a valuable preview of the 
“doctrinal, ethical and institutional dilemmas” they will have to 
confront in the near future.3 
Just how important a role genetic information might play in 
establishing causation becomes evident in reading Dr. Joseph 
Rodricks’ paper which concludes that the problem of individual 
disease causation has to date received inadequate treatment in the 
scientific literature.4 After describing the objectives and 
assumptions underlying regulatory risk assessments and examining 
how toxicological and epidemiological information is used, he 
explains why the results of such assessments cannot be 
extrapolated to prove disease causation in individuals. Although he 
sets out an analytical model for evaluating causation in individuals, 
Dr. Rodricks cautions that much less of a scientific consensus 
exists about appropriate scientific approaches than in the 
regulatory context. He also notes that it is difficult to imagine how 
plaintiffs could develop the evidence required by his model with 
regard to chemicals that have not yet been studied. He concludes 
by calling on the National Academies of Science to undertake a 
study of general and specific causation that would clarify what 
                                                          
 2 Gary E. Marchant, Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 
7, 8 (2006). 
 3 Id. at 37. 
 4 Joseph V. Rodricks, Evaluating Disease Causation in Humans Exposed to 
Toxic Substances, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 39, 63 (2006). 
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types of scientific evidence are relevant to prove causation in 
judicial proceedings. 
A totally different approach to issues relating to proof of 
causation is offered by Lisa Heinzerling, a law professor, who 
finds that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on guarding against 
unreliable scientific evidence has led to numerous problems.5 She 
faults the Supreme Court for opening the door to what she terms 
judicial “junk science.” As examples of the courts’ disregard for 
standard scientific practices, she discusses opinions that refuse to 
accept a “weight of the evidence” approach, reject animal studies 
and linear dose-response models, and exclude epidemiological 
studies showing a relative risk of less than 2.0.6 Many additional 
“doubts” about Daubert are voiced in Professor Heinzerling’s 
essay. Her core concern is that evidentiary rulings under Daubert 
have eroded substantive standards, particularly in toxic tort cases. 
She concludes that the courts’ preoccupation with, and struggles to 
master, complex issues regarding scientific expertise have led them 
to ignore the subjects with which the law should be concerned. 
Professors Eleanor Singer’s and Alan Morrison’s essays 
examine the issues that arise when society’s ever growing needs 
for data come up against other competing claims.7 After an 
overview of recent federal legislation that affects access to 
research data,8 Professor Singer turns to the complex policy issues 
created by the explosion in technology. On the one hand, more 
information than ever before is being collected by governmental 
agencies. This information is of vital interest to researchers and is 
needed to assist the government in designing, planning and 
implementing its policies. On the other hand, public concerns 
                                                          
 5 Lisa Heinzerling, Doubting Daubert, 14 J.L. & Pol’y 65, 65-66 (2006) 
(she first discusses the two Supreme Court opinions that established new 
guidelines for expert testimony based on scientific knowledge, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) followed by General 
Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997)). 
 6 Id. at 68-74. 
 7 Eleanor Singer, Access to Research Data: Reconciling Risks and Benefits, 
14 J.L. & Pol’y 85 (2006); Alan B. Morrison, Balancing Access to Government-
Controlled Information, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 115, 116 (2006). 
 8 Singer, supra note 7, at 89-91. 
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about privacy and confidentiality have increased as advances in 
technology have made intrusions into sensitive, personal data ever 
more possible. After Professor Singer explains the costs and 
benefits that must be balanced, she discusses ways in which the 
confidentiality of research data can be safeguarded by techniques 
such as data masking and creating synthetic data.9 It is quite clear 
from Professor Singer’s discussion that the trade-offs between 
making data freely available and protecting confidentiality are 
complex and costly, and that the courts will of necessity be 
involved in overseeing these choices. The decisions will have 
significant consequences for researchers, litigants and our 
citizenry. 
Professor Morrison’s essay examines a variety of procedures 
that may enable a requester to obtain information from different 
branches of the government.10 After discussing issues that arise 
under the Freedom of Information Act,11 Professor Morrison 
examines the newer “Data Quality” laws,12 and then turns to 
information sought in litigation, considering issues such as the 
impact of Daubert, and the proper use of protective orders.13 
Throughout, Professor Morrison’s emphasis is on the balancing of 
competing interests that ultimately determines whether the 
requested data will be disclosed. Seeing examples of this balancing 
in the very different contexts which Professor Morrison considers 
enables the reader to appreciate the many factors that decision 
makers take, or ought to take, into account. 
Professor Gillian Hadfield’s essay on data should be of great 
interest to anyone concerned with the workings of the courts.14 Her 
research examines the collection of data pertaining to the legal 
system. She concludes that far too few data are available to allow 
for a scientific, systematic assessment of how our federal and state 
                                                          
 9 Id. at 109-11. 
 10 Morrison, supra note 7, at 116-23. 
 11 Id. at 116-20. 
 12 Id. at 120-23. 
 13 Id. at 132-36. 
 14 Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis 
of Beliefs about the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better 
Data about Law, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 137 (2006). 
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judicial systems function, and notes the irony of judges enforcing 
strict standards for the admission of scientific expert testimony 
while they lack information about the impact of their practices. She 
poses a number of important questions about the consequences of 
the Daubert opinion that have not been empirically studied.15 The 
problems in data collection that Professor Hadfield identifies make 
it impossible to carry out such an investigation.16 Professor 
Hadfield illustrates the frustrations of attempting empirical 
research by describing her attempt to validate claims that federal 
trials are vanishing.17 She finds that our knowledge about trial rates 
is too slim to support conclusions on how our legal system could 
be improved, and cautions that the difficult questions about the 
effects of Daubert cannot be reliably answered unless we find a 
way to collect and analyze the relevant data instead of relying on 
anecdotes and personal experience. 
In the last essay in this collection, Professor Claire Kelly 
returns to a topic that was covered at a previous Science for Judges 
conference18 and is touched on by some other contributors to this 
volume19—the role of Daubert in the regulatory arena.20 After 
discussing a number of ways in which a Daubert analysis could be 
inserted into administrative decision-making,21 Professor Kelly 
explains why she thinks such a paradigm shift would be 
“unwarranted, unclear, and unhelpful.”22 Professor Kelly fears that 
“Daubertization” would undermine administrative functioning and 
would undo some of the gains achieved after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chevron U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.23 opened the door to greater administrative 
                                                          
 15 Id. at 138-39. 
 16 Id. at 140-47. 
 17 Id. at 137-62. 
 18 Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies 
Through the Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589 (2004). 
 19 Morrison, supra note 7, at 130-31. 
 20 Claire R. Kelly, The Dangers of Daubert Creep in the Regulatory Realm, 
14 J.L. & POL’Y 165 (2006). 
 21 Id. at 174-90. 
 22 Id. at 190. 
 23 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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flexibility. Like the Chevron shift which Professor Kelly 
elucidates, a Daubert shift would be costly and lead to years of 
uncertainty without the positive pay-off that Chevron ultimately 
provided. The article bolsters this conclusion by examining the 
variety of ways in which Daubert has been invoked in 
administrative law cases to date.24 
These brief descriptions of the essays that follow offer but a 
glimpse of the complex, cutting-edge issues that are addressed. I 





                                                          
 24 Kelly, supra note 20, at 198-209. 
